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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States is presently committed to landing 
a man on the Moon within this decade. This is a formi-
dable goal; however, to the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) it is not a final objective - 
it is just a beginning of real space exploration. Besides 
the major effort required by the APOLLO Program, it 
is necessary for NASA to start initial planning for the 
future, more ambitious missions. 
Launch vehicles continue to be one of the major 
pacing items in the progress of space exploration. The 
largest launch vehicle now under development is the 
SATURN V; however, planning is underway for a Post-
SATURN vehicle, which could greatly increase our capa-
bilities for planetary exploration. 
This planning effort must first determine under what 
conditions a Post-SATURN is justified. In other words, 
what is the size of space programs beyond which ,
 it is 
desirable to develop a launch vehicle larger than 
SATURN V. Then by having some indication of the future 
program, . questions of why we need a Post-SATURN, 
when we need it, and what is the best concept can be 
answered. The study effort presently underway is aimed 
at providing the necessary data to attempt to answer 
these questions. Because of the uncertainty in the de-
velopment timing of the next large launch vehicle, a 
broad approach has been taken. The vehicle concepts 
under study are divided into four categories or classes. 
Each 'class is defined on the basis of the advancement in 
technology required to demonstrate technical feasibility 
or soundness of approach. This, of course, gives a 
wide range of possible availability dates - from 1974 to 
1985.
II. POSSIBLE VEHICLE CONCEPTS 
Conceptual design effort is being accomplished in 
all vehicle classes. The approach has been to start with 
all possible concepts in each class and narrow them down 
through further study and comparisons. In this manner, 
we can focus on the most promising concepts in each 
vehicle class. In order to proceed with the missions 
analysis work in parallel with the vehicle design effort, 
representative or baseline configurations were selected 
in each class. The selection of these baselines does 
not mean they are best in their class - only representa-
tive of the technology and availability offered by the 
class. It is then possible to make certain interclass 
comparisons with these baseline concepts.
Class I contains the concepts using current tech-
nology and are essentially within the present state-of-
the-art. The configurations are expendable and use 
propulsion systems currently under development. These 
include the M- 1, the large solid, and the F-i or an up-
rated version of the F- 1. The selected baseline for 
Class I is shown in Figure 1. This vehicle has 18 F-i 
type engines (rated at 1.8 x 106 pounds of thrust) in the 
first stage and three M-1 engines in the second stage. 
The first stage diameter is 65.5 feet; the second stage 
diameter is 60 feet; and the vehicle height is approxi-
mately 460 feet including payload. Both stages use sepa-
rate tanks and are expendable. 
Class II represents concepts using advanced tech-
nology. The principle areas of advancement are pro-
pulsion and recovery. New propulsion systems are 
considered using such features as high chamber pressure, 
up to 3, 000 psia, and unconventional nozzles, achieving 
some degree of altitude compensation. Numerous trade 
off studies have shown the most attractive concepts in 
this class are two stage vehicles with a recoverable first 
stage. Recovery and reuse of the first stage can offer 
almost a 40 percent improvement in cost effectiveness 
for a launch rate of about 10 per year. Recovery of the 
second stage can offer further improvement of about 
8 percent; however, the technical problems associated 
with recovery of items of this size from near orbital 
velocities are serious and at this time are not consider-
ed worth the potential gains for the Class II Post-SATURN. 
Advanced propulsion concepts in themselves will 
improve the cost effectiveness of Class II over Class I 
in the order of 15 percent. This gain, combined with 
recovery, results in an improvement of cost effective-
ness of about 50 percent going from Class I to Class II. 
The most desirable advanced propulsion system has not 
been determined to date, since a great deal of required 
experimental work is needed to verify the performance 
assumptions that have been used in the studies. A 
typical Class II concept is shown in Figure 2. Each 
stage is 70 feet in diameter, and the vehicle height is 
about 420 feet. The improvement in gross weight to 
payload ratio of this concept over the Class I baseline 
should be noted. 
Class III concepts utilize very advanced technology, 
particularly in the areas of propulsion, structures, and 
recovery from near orbital velocity. The ideal Class III. 
concept is a single stage to orbit, fully recoverable vehi-
cle. Several configurations have been studied; however, 
analyses have shown the vehicle performance to be ex-
tremely sensitive to specific impulse and dry stage 
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weight assumptions. At the present time, our confidence 
in the existing data is relatively low, because of the lack 
of experimental data to verify the assumptions made in 
the studies. In attempts to eliminate this sensitivity, 
several alternate concepts have been studied. These 
include expendable tanks, solid and liquid JATO units, 
flourine substitution, and expendable second stages. 
Conclusions concerning the most attractive concept can-
not be made at this time. 
One of the possible features of a Class III Post-
SATURN vehicle could be a variable payload capability. 
This capability is of interest, since it would provide 
greater payload design and mission planning flexibility.. 
However, at this time it is not possible to determine the 
desirability of this feature, since the specific mission 
requirements cannot be defined. For the purposes of 
the mission analysis studies, a representative Class III 
configuration was selected and is shown in Figure 3. 
This is a basic single-stage to orbit, fully recoverable 
concept with 826, 000 pound payload capability. For 
larger payload missions, an expendable second stage 
can be added, which gives a 1, 250, 000 pound capability. 
The vehicle is about 120 feet in diameter and 220 feet 
high with second stage and payload. 
Class IV represents the combination of a Class II 
or Class III chemical first stage with an advanced nucle -
ar upper stage. The application of these configurations 
is primarily two-stage to Earth escape. The work in 
this area has been aimed at determining the capability 
of the Post-SATURN chemical first stage to accommodate 
solid core, gaseous core, and nuclear pulse upper stage 
when, and if, they become available. 
III. MISSION ANALYSIS 
To this point the question of what possible configu-
rations of a large Post-SATURN vehicle are of interest 
has been discussed. The questions of why and when do 
we need it can only be answered after some potential 
missions and schedules are established. In order to 
attempt to determine the role of a Post-SATURN vehicle, 
four different mission plans or models were developed. 
These represented a large space program on an opti-
mistic schedule, a large program on a pessimistic 
schedule, a minimum space program on an optimistic 
schedule, and a minimum program on a pessimistic 
schedule. These were developed in such a manner as 
to try to bracket the actual space program for the future 
which, of course, cannot be defined at present. 
The missions assumed covered the orbital, lunar, 
and both the manned and unmanned planetary categories, 
and were constructed to represent possible follow ons 
to existing programs. The time period under study is 
1970 to 1990. 
Figure 4 is included to give an indication of the 
magnitude of the small and large programs without 
going into detail. Besides varying the number of mis-
sions, the size of each mission was varied in the manned 
planetary area. As an example, the initial manned Mars
landing was assumed to be with a fleet of four ships for 
the large programs and only two ships for the small 
programs. Shown in Figure 5 is the effect of schedule 
on the programs. For simplicity the two extremes are 
shown. It shows, for example,on the optimistic schedule 
a Venus flyby which was assumed in 1973. For the 
programs on the pessimistic schedule, the time was 
1979. It can be seen that there is the same variation of 
the selected missions with schedule. For example, a 
Mars capture mission was assumed for the small 
programs, but not for the large ones. For the small 
programs, the most ambitious mission selected was a 
manned Mars landing. Both the large programs included 
a Mars Synodic Base, and for the one on an optimistic. 
schedule, another even more advanced mission was 
assumed. 
Each set of assumed mission objectives was then 
accomplished with four different combinations of present 
and future launch vehicles. All vehicle mixes used the 
SATURN IB, SATURN V, and the 10-passenger reusable 
orbital transport, which was assumed to be available in 
1978 for the optimistic schedule programs and 1982 for 
the pessimistic. An improved capability of 300, 000 
pounds to orbit was assumed for the SATURN V vehicle. 
The following are the vehicle mixes used: 
No. 1 - SATURN IB, SATURN V, 10-passenger 
No. 2 - No. 1 and Post-SATURN Class I 
No. 3 - No. 1 and Post-SATURN Class II 
No. 4 - No. 1 and Post-SATURN Class III 
With these combinations, it should be possible to 
determine the role of a Post-SATURN launch vehicle in 
the overall space program. The flow diagram shown in 
Figure 6 shows the logic used for the calculations. For 
each mission objective, the spacecraft and the required 
space propulsion systems were identified, sized, and 
costed. A mode of accomplishment was then selected, 
i.e., either a direct flight, as in the case of the lunar 
missions, or via orbital operations, as in the case of 
most manned planetary missions. Orbital operations 
burden rates were then assessed to those missions 
through orbit. The sum of the direct flights, the mis-
sion flights to orbit, and the flights needed for orbital 
support gives the total launch requirements versus time. 
From these launch rates the number of launch vehicles 
could be calculated. For expendable vehicles, of course, 
the launch rate equals the number required; however, 
for reusable vehicles suitable reuse rates, turn around 
time, and refurbishment cost were assumed. The program 
cost was determined by adding the spacecraft and space 
propulsion costs, the launch vehicle costs, and the orbit-
al operations support costs. This was done on both a 
direct operating and total operating cost basis; the latter 
including development and facilities. 
From the mission objectives and the proper relia-
bility analysis the mission yield in terms of number of 
pounds delivered, number of men, number of manyears,
etc., are known. By combining these yields with the 
appropriate cost, the various indices of performance 
are determined. Following this procedure for various 
mixes of launch vehicles and various mission objectives, 
produces sets of indices of performance, which can then 
be compared to determine the most efficient vehicle or 
vehicle mix for each set of mission objectives or space 
programs.
Iv. RF.SIJT.TS 
The average yearly expenditure for the small 
program ranged from $3.3 billion to $3.9 billion depend-
ing on schedule and vehicle mix. For the large program 
the range was from $4.6 billion to $7.0 billion. These 
expenditures appear to bracket the FY 64 NASA budget 
for the portion of the overall program under consider-
ation in this paper. The variation of this average annual 
cost, as a function of vehicle mix, is shown in Figure 7. 
Since the mission yield is relatively constant for each 
combination of launch vehicles, these costs represent a 
measure of effectiveness. For the large program on 
either the optimistic or pessimistic schedule, the combi-
nation of SATURN V and a Class II Post-SATURN (Mix 
No. 3) appears to be the most efficient. The large 
program is too large for SATURN V only. The Class III 
Post-SATURN (Mix No. 4) is closer to the minimum cost 
for the pessimistic schedule, since its late availaLility 
comes closer to matching the manned planetary mission 
schedule. The more the mission schedule is compressed, 
the more off-minimum the Class III vehicle mix. 
For the small programs, the SATURN V only (Mix 
No. 1) represents minimum cost because of the reduced 
number of mission requirements. However,, on the pessi-
mistic schedule, the Class II Post-SATURN (Mix No. 3) 
is not far from the minimum cost, since its availability 
is more compatible with the planetary missions. 
Another aspect to be considered is the resulting 
launch rates needed to meet the assumed mission ob-
jectives. These are shown in Figure 33 in terms of 
average annual requirements. For the large programs, 
SATURN V only (Mix No. 1) results in very high launch 
rates. The addition of any Post-SATURN can greatly re-
duce these rates. In all cases the SATURN V require -
ments increase, when the introduction of a Post-SATURN 
capability is delayed from Class I to Class II to Class III. 
As a last point of consideration, the cost effective-
ness of the various vehicle mixes is of interest. In an 
attempt to put all programs on an equal basis, an orbital 
equivalent cost effectiveness was calculated. This repre-
sents the cost effectiveness of the various transportation 
systems, if all launches were made to Earth orbit. The 
results are shown in Figure 9 in terms of both direct 
operating cost (DOC) and total operating cost (TOC), 
which includes facilities and development. The numbers 
shown represent the average of the combination of vehi-
cles in each mix. For example, the effectiveness of Mix 
No. 4 is an average of all the SATURN IB, SATURN V, 
and Post-SATURN Class III vehicles required to meet 
the assumed mission objectives. The 10-passenger re-
usable orbital transport vehicle flights have been excluded
in the calculation, since they are used to carry person-
nel and not cargo. For the large program, Mix. No. 3 
(Post-SATURN Class II) is favored from both the direct 
and total cost effectiveness standpoint. It can be seen 
that the direct cost effectiveness becomes greater for 
Mixes No. I and 2 with a stretch out in schedule, where-
as it improves for Mixes No. 3 and 4. This is because 
the stretched out programs are more compatible with 
the later availability of the Class II and III Post-SATURN. 
The SATURN V only is the most effective from a total 
cost standpoint for the small program on an optimistic 
schedule, even though the Post-SATURN Class II mix is 
best on a direct cost basis. If the small program 
schedule is stretched, then Mix No. 3 becomes the most 
efficient.
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The preliminary data available at this time and sum-
marized in this paper cannot be used to answer ex-
plicitly the questions of Why, When, and What about 
Post-SATURN; however, some interesting trends are 
apparent. It appears that a Post-SATURN capability is 
desirable, if we are going to have manned planetary 
exploration. Even the small program on a stretched 
out schedule showed Post-SATURN to be the most ef-
fective. 
The questions of -,.When and What should be consider-
ed together. The Class I type vehicle did not look favor-
able for any of the programs studied. This is true for 
two reasons: (I) it does not offer sufficient cost effective-
ness over SATURN V, and (2) it was available prior to 
the planetary mission requirements. The Class II con-
cept gave the best direct cost effectiveness under all 
programs considered and the best total cost effectiveness 
in all but the small program on an optimistic schedule. 
This class offers significant improvement over SATURN V 
and at a time that is compatible with the planetary mis-
sions. The Class III vehicle did no, ,produce favorable 
results because of its late availability. Programs with 
more pessimistic schedules would permit better utili-
zation of Class III, and would therefore produce better 
cost effectiveness. 
It can be concluded that with a relatively large space 
program, there is a role for Post-SATURN. The exact 
size and composition of theprogram that economically 
justifies a large launch vehicle remain to be determined. 
The exact vehicle concept eventually selected will depend 
on the state-of-the-art at the time of development initi-
ation, but will probably include some degree of advanced 
propulsion and some form of recovery and reuse.
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ASSUMED MISSION OBJECTIVES 
UNMANNED MANNED ORBITAL LUNAR PLANETARY PLANETARY 
NO. OF MANNED MAX. SIZE 
SPACE STATIONS OF BASE NO. OF MISSIONS NO. OF MISSIONS 
PQ OF MEN) 
LARGE PROGRAM 24 80 37 II OPTIMISTIC SCHEDULE 
LARGE PROGRAM 24 80 37 7  
PESSIMISTIC SCHEDULE 
SMALL PROGRAM 
OPTIMISTIC SCHEDULE tO 12 18 8 
SMALL PROGRAM 
PESSIMISTIC SCHEDULE 10 12 18 5
S 
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AVERAGE ANNUAL EXPENDITURE 
(IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
MIX SPACE PROGRAM OPTIMISTIC SCHEDULE PESSIMISTIC SCHEDULE 
6.97 5.37 
2 6.67 4.95 
LARGE 
3 6.13 4.60 
4 6.27 4.64 
I 3.33 3.40 
2 3.88 3.62 
SMALL 
3 3.78 3.51 
4 3.76 3.55 
AVERAGE ANNUAL LAUNCH REQUIREMENTS 
- SPACE OPTIMISTIC SCHEDULE PESSIMISTIC SCHEDULE 
MIX PROGRAM SATURN V POST-SATURN SATURN V POST-SATURN 
I 62.7 0 47.0 0 
2 8.9 11.2 4.0 9.1 
LARGE 
3 8.9 11.9 5.7 9.3 
4 11.9 10.0 8.8 7.7 
20.4 0 15.0 0 
2 4.4 32 3.0 2.9 
SMALL 
3 4.6 4.0 3.2 3.0 
4 6.1 3.3 4.9 2.3 
Fgur,9 
EQUIVALENT ORBITAL COST EFFECTIVENESS 
(dollars per pound) 
SPACE OPTIMISTIC PESSIMISTIC 
MIX 
-
PROGRAM SCHEDULE SCHEDULE 
I
DOC
116.5
TOC
141.3
DOC
123.3
TOC
150.3 
2 107.6 152.8 109.4 161.6 
LARGE 
3 70.3 114.6 65.8 117.1 
4 76.4 122.8 69.8 124.9 
100.2 129.4 156.6 195.6 
2 129.1 208.5 133.3 238.3 
SMALL 
3 89.0 168.7 91.6 190.8 
4 95.1 182.9 107.0 217.5
